A Nonlinear Correlation Measure for Intrusion Detection by Ambu Saidi, MA et al.
“© 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be 
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing 
this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for 
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this 
work in other works.” 
 
  
A nonlinear correlation measure for Intrusion Detection 
 
Mohammed Ambusaidi, Liang Fu Lu, Xiangjian He*, Zhiyuan Tan, Aruna Jamdagni, Priyadarsi Nanda 
Centre for Innovation in IT Services and Applications (iNEXT) 
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia 
Contact Email: xiangjian.he@uts.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract—The popularity of using internet contains some risks 
of network attacks. It has attracted the attention of many 
researchers to overcome this problem. One of the effective 
ways that plays an important role to achieve higher security 
and protect networks against attacks is the use of intrusion 
detection systems. Intrusion detection systems are defined as 
security techniques that tend to detect individuals who are 
trying to sneak into a system without authorization. However, 
one technical challenge in intrusion detection systems is high 
rate of false positive alarms which affect their performance. To 
solve this problem, we propose an effective method, which can 
accurately find the correlation between network records. In 
this work, we compare the results using a linear measure and a 
nonlinear measure based on correlation coefficient and mutual 
information. Experiments on KDD Cup 99 data set show that 
our proposed method using the nonlinear correlation measure 
can not only reduce the rate of false alarms but also efficiently 
distinguish normal and abnormal behaviors, and provide 
higher detection and accuracy rate then using the linear 
correlation measure.  
Keywords-Intrusion Detection; Nonlinear correlation; 
Mutual Information (MI); Pearson’s  Correlation coefficient;  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Defending networks against attacks and intrusions is a 
delicated task and a complicated act. It requires extensive 
resources, time and well-trained administrators with 
adequate knowledge. Intrusion detection and prevention 
systems, firewalls and antivirus software are security 
mechanisms that are working together in a complementary 
system to provide a safe and secure communication 
environment for neural networks. Although such 
mechanisms play an important role in defending networks, 
they are still susceptible to some limitations that affect their 
performance and these need to be addressed. 
The rapid growth of malicious threats and cybercrimes 
encourages researchers to develop and propose numerous 
security algorithms and prevention mechanisms. Intrusion 
Detection Systems, which are basically designed based on 
the assumption that the intruder’s behavior is different from 
a normal flow, are necessary to achieve higher security [1]. 
They are security management systems that are developed to 
create a second level of defense together with anti-virus 
software.  
Intrusion detection techniques can be broadly categorized 
into two main classes. The first class is signature-based 
anomaly systems or misuse detection systems, where 
information and feature of past intrusions are used to detect 
ongoing anomalies [2], [3]. This technique tends to keep 
records of all the different types of attacks in a database 
called Attack Signature Database. They can identify the 
types of malicious attacks based on the built signatures and 
even activate the response to particular intrusion. Bro system 
is a popular example for this technique. It is a stand-alone 
system for monitoring communication links in real-time 
traffic and detects the incoming intrusions [3]. These systems 
are widely used because they are simple and efficient, and; 
have low number of false positive alarms. However, one of 
the disadvantages of these systems is that the detection 
accuracy and efficiency which are dependent on the quality 
of attack signatures. Furthermore, the extraction of high 
quality signatures requires the involvement of 
knowledgeable experts in extensive study of malicious 
behavior, which is costly and time consuming. Moreover, 
intrusion’s signature is required before the system can detect 
the corresponding attack so these IDSs cannot detect any 
novel attacks due to the lack of their signatures.  
The second class is anomaly detection systems, which 
recognize anomalous behavior from the normal flow [4]. 
Compared with signature-based detection, anomaly detection 
systems offer an advantage of detecting unidentified attacks. 
That is because they depend on statistical methods to 
calculate deviations from the normal traffic behaviors. They 
use Network History Database instead of Attack Signature 
Database to collect information about the normal behavior 
on a network and then create a model of normal flow. After 
that any deviation from the normal flow will be considered 
as suspicious behavior [5]. The main advantages of these 
approaches are the ability to recognize normal and abnormal 
attacks, and do not require a continuously update for their 
attack knowledge base. However, a major weakness of these 
techniques is that they are susceptible to high false positive 
rate and low detection accuracy especially with attacks that 
look like normal behavior. These limitations encourage us to 
focus on developing an anomaly detection system that can 
overcome the weakness. 
Recent researches have widely used machine learning 
techniques on building IDSs. Machine learning techniques 
have the ability to improve and enhance the performance of 
detection algorithms. They can be used to increase the 
detection rate and decrease the false alarm rate in IDS [6].  
Numerous machine learning techniques used in anomaly-
based detection systems include Bayesian network [7], [8], 
nearest-neighbor methods [9], feature selection methods [10] 
  
and Markov models [11]. However, machine learning 
techniques still suffer from some challenges such as high 
false positive rate and low detection accuracy rate.  
Therefore, we propose an effective method, which can 
accurately find the correlation between network records. We 
name the correlation a nonlinear correlation coefficient-
based Mutual Information (MI). The proposed method in this 
paper is sensitive to any relationship, not just the linear 
dependence [12]. It is more rational than the current 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) method in theory and 
can help intrusion detection techniques to improve their 
performance. In addition, we investigate our findings by 
proposing both a linear measure and a nonlinear measure 
based on correlation coefficient and mutual information for 
describing the relationship of random variables.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides current related works to our research. We describe 
the linear and nonlinear correlations based on Pearson’s 
correlation and MI, in Section 3. Experiments and results are 
stated in Section 4. Finally, conclusions and future works are 
presented in Section 5. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Correlation in the security point of view can be used to 
improve the threat identification and the assessment process 
by looking not only at individual events, but also at their 
groups. Nonlinear correlation coefficient (NCC) have been 
widely applied in many fields including fuzzy correlation 
method [13] and mechanical engineering [14]. In this paper, 
we will apply NCC based Mutual Information in the security 
field, which is sensitive to any relation, to measure the 
relationship between random traffic records.  
Different IDSs have been developed using correlation 
technique to differentiate between the normal and abnormal 
flow. Ning et al. [15] proposed an intrusion detection 
technique based on correlation coefficient matrix. This 
anomaly detection method mainly focuses on calculating the 
quantitative correlation between TCP packets. Based on the 
assumption that intruders have different behavior than a 
normal user, Jin et al. in [16] developed a model utilizing the 
covariance matrix of sequential samples to detect multiple 
network attacks. They evaluated the correlation among the 
samples. In order to investigate the performance of their 
model, they applied two different statistical pattern 
recognition approaches: a threshold based detection 
approach and a traditional decision tree approach to detect 
anomalies. Their experimental results have showed that both 
approaches can distinguish multiple known attacks in the 
covariance feature space effectively.  
Recently, there are some researches applying Mutual 
Information methods for feature selection to improve the 
performance of IDSs and identify the deviation behaviors 
from the normal flow. Sakar et al. in [17], modified MI and 
proposed a feature selection method named Predictive 
Mutual Information (PMI). The main objective of their 
method is to improve the feature detection capability 
especially in catching suspicious coincidences. They have 
applied their method on intrusion detection system and 
showed high rate in distinguishing between bad connections 
and normal connections. Amiri et al. stated that one of the 
challenges in IDS was the curse of high dimensional data 
[10]. To overcome this problem, they developed a feature 
selection algorithm using a modified mutual information-
based feature selection (MMIFS). MMIFS is a feature 
selection method with maximum relevancy and minimum 
redundancy. They compared the performance of their 
method with two other feature selection methods: linear 
correlation–based feature selection (LCFS) and forward 
feature selection (FFSA). By applying the three methods in 
IDS, they have shown that MMIFS has higher classification 
accuracy and detection rate than LCFS and FFSA.  
After several literature studies, we propose a nonlinear 
correlation method-based on Mutual information. The target 
of our method is high detection rate with reduced false rate. 
III. LINEAR AND NONLINEAR CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
The correlation of two variables is a statistical technique 
that can indicate the magnitude relationship between the two 
variables. It also shows how the two variables interact with 
each other. In this section, we present two correlation 
measures: Pearson’s correlation and a nonlinear correlation 
based on MI measure. 
A. Linear correlation coefficients 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) [18] is one of the 
basic linear correlation methods used to measure dependence 
between two variables. It is defined as:  
Assume X and Y are two random variables, ix and iy  are 
their sample values for i=1, 2,…….., n. Their PCC is the 
covariance ratio of the variables divided by the product of 
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  indicate the mean for 
X and Y respectively.  
The value of PCC ranges in the closed interval [-1, 1], 
which indicates the linear correlation degree of the two 
variables. When the PCC value is close to 1 or -1, it denotes 
a strong relationship. If the PCC is close to 0, it means a 
weak relationship between the two variables. A positive or 
negative correlation coefficient denotes that both variables 
are in the same way or in the opposite way. 
B. Nonlinear correlation information entropy 
Although, linear correlation can detect the relationship 
between two dependent variables, in real world the 
correlations can also be nonlinear. Mutual Information, 
which is a quantity that measures a relationship between two 
discrete random variables, plays an important role in the 
  
computation of NCC. It can be thought of as a generalized 
correlation analogous to the linear correlation coefficient, but 
sensitive to any relationship including the linear correlation 
[19], [20]. The Mutual Information ( ; )I X Y  between two 
discrete random variables X and Y is given by   
( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( , )I X Y H X H Y H X Y                     (2) 
where ( )H X  is the information entropy of the variable X, 
which is defined as 
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and ( , )H X Y is the joint entropy of X and Y defined by 
1 1
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ip denotes the probability distribution that random variable 
X will be in state ix , and ijp denotes the joint probability 
distribution that X is in state ix and Y is in state jy . 
The disadvantage of Mutual Information is that it does 
not range in a definite closed interval [0, 1] as the correlation 
coefficient does [21]. Therefore, Wang et al. [22] developed 
a revised version of the MI named nonlinear correlation 
coefficient. The revised joint entropy of the two variables 
X andY  is given by 
1 1








                                     (5) 
in which b b rank grids are used to place the sample 
pairs 1{( , )} ,i i i Nx y   to the rank sequences of X and Y , 
and ijn is the number of samples distributed in the ij-th rank 
grid. The nonlinear correlation coefficient is defined as 
( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( , ),r r rNCC X Y H X H Y H X Y           (6) 
where ( )rH X is the revised entropy of the variable X , 










                                               (7) 
Therefore, the nonlinear correlation coefficient in (6) can be 
rewritten as 
1 1








                             (8) 
The NCC in (8) can describe the relationships between two 
discrete random variables within a definite closed interval [0, 
1]; with 0 and 1 indicates the weakest and the strongest 
relationship, respectively. In the following section, we apply 
(8) to measure the linear or nonlinear relationship between 
network records because of its sensitivity to any relation. 
C. Intrusion detection  algorithm based on the correlation 
coefficient. 
In this section, we propose a method, which is mainly based 
on nonlinear correlation coefficient of different network 
traffic, to detect the intrusions among them. By analyzing the 
different correlation coefficients among the correlation 
matrix of the network traffic, we utilize a threshold 
value to judge whether the two different records are strong 
correlation or not, where   belongs to the interval[0,1] .  
Algorithm:  
Step 1: Extract the data and generate the original matrix A . 
Step 2: Compute the NCC of each two columns of A  using 
formulas listed in the section B, which forms the correlation 
matrix of network traffic nccS . 
Step 3: Detect the abnormal traffic from the whole data set. 
3.1 Check the columns and find out the ones whose 
elements are lower than . From these values occurred 
in the columns, it can be considered that the records 
corresponding to the columns are abnormal. 
 3.2 After we get the abnormal records from the Step 3.1, 
we can easily find out elements corresponding to the 
records who are related to the abnormal ones in 
nccS that are larger than . It is natural that they can be 
considered as the abnormal records. 
It should be noticed that the matrix we get in Step 2 is 
symmetric because of the same correlation coefficient 
between the ij-th and ji-th records. From the experience, we 
always set the threshold value  to be 0.5 manually. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
A. The data set 
The data set used in these experiments is a 10 percent 
KDD Cup 99 data (kdd.ics.uci.edu//databases/kddcup99/ 
kddcup99.html), which is a well-known dataset for intrusion 
evaluation. It consists of about five million connection 
records. Each record is defined as either normal or attack. 
The data set contains 24 attack types that have been 
categorized into four classes: Probe, Denial of Service 
(DOS), User to Root (U2R) and Remote to User (R2U) [23]. 
In order to measure the effectiveness of our method, we have 
chosen 1000 records randomly with six types of attacks 
including Smurf, Neptune, Land, Teardrop, Back and Pod 
attack. In fact, the method can work well for all types of 
attacks and the purpose of choosing these particular types of 
attacks is to test the effectiveness of the NCC. However, as a 
future work, we are planning to extend our experiments to 
more attacks. Each record in the data set, including normal 
and attack records, has 41 security parameters. We calculate 
the correlation between these records using both PCC and 
  
NCC methods to identify the normal and abnormal records. 
Record that has strong relationship, close to 1, with other 
records that are considered to be normal traffic, can be 
judged as the normal one. On the other hand, the record that 
has weak relation, close to 0, can be flagged as suspicious 
behavior. 
B. Experimental results 
In our experiments, we set detection rate and false 
positive rate as standard measurements to evaluate the 
performance and effectiveness of our method. Firstly, to 
explain the details of our method, we have randomly selected 
six normal traffics with four different types of attacks from 
the chosen data set, and then calculated the corresponding 
correlation coefficient-based Pearson’s correlation and 
nonlinear correlation coefficient-based Mutual Information. 
The following two matrices summarize the calculated results 
of PCC and NCC. Each element ijs in the matrix behaves the 
linear and nonlinear coefficients between the i-th and j-th 
records: 
 1 0.6785 0.8365 0.5164 0.9929 0.7926 0.5644 0.4858 0.6316 -0.0405
0.6785 1 0.9592 0.9794 0.7463 0.9047 0.0533 -0.0228  0.1043 -0.0441
0.8365 0.9592 1 0.8877 0.8899 0.8864 0.2789 0.1021 0.2153 -0.0465
0.5164 0.9794 0.8877 1 0.596
pccS 
9 0.8387 -0.0984 -0.0979 -0.0355 0.0477
0.9929 0.7463 0.8899 0.5969 1 0.8184 0.5372 0.4073 0.5423 -0.0266
0.7926 0.9047 0.8864 0.8387 0.8184 1  0.1059 0.3703 0.5020 -0.0470
0.5644 0.0533 0.2789 -0.0984 0.5372  0.1059 1 0.4045 0.4826 0.0096
0.4858 -0.0228 0.1021 -0.0979 0.4073 0.3703 0.4045 1  0.8173 0.3732
0.6316  0.1043 0.2153 -0.0355 0.5423 0.5020 0.4826  0.8173 1 -0.0423
































(a) Correlation Coefficient-based Pearson’s correlation  
1 0.9747 0.9505 0.9262 0.9828 0.8575 0.0786 -0.0226 0.0393 -0.0369
0.9747 1 0.9019 0.9005 0.9303 0.9248 0.0419 0.0750 0.0068 -0.0180
0.9505 0.9019 1 0.8564 0.9056 0.9019 0.0662 -0.0092 -0.0133 0.0124
0.9262 0.9005 0.8564 1 0.8810
nccS 
0.8547 -0.0984 0.0044 0.0178 -0.0114
0.9828 0.9303 0.9056 0.8810 1 0.8575  0.1187 0.0419 -0.3656 -0.0224
0.8575 0.9248 0.9019 0.8547 0.8575 1 0.0419 -0.0288 0.0068 -0.0185
0.0786 0.0419 0.0662 -0.0984  0.1187 0.0419 1 0.1383 0.0183 -0.0021
-0.0226 0.0750 -0.0092 0.0044 0.0419 -0.0288 0.1383 1 0.0514 0.0697
0.0393 0.0068 -0.0133 0.0178 -0.3656 0.0068 0.0183 0.0514 1 -0.0347

































(b) Nonlinear correlation-based Mutual Information 
Figure 1.  Correlation Coefficient-based Pearson’s correlation and 
Nonlinear correlation-based Mutual Information. 
The following paragraphs explain how to identify the 
normal records and abnormal records. Assume that the first 
six records are normal and the last four records are abnormal. 
We set 0.5 as the threshold value for the correlation 
coefficients between these records, and any values less than 
0.5 will be treated as anomaly.  
From the results not only in Figure 1 but also in the other 
numerical results such as those shown in Figure 2 and Figure 
3, it can be observed that our approach using NCC achieves 
higher detection accuracy than PCC. For example, we can 
observe form Figure 1(a), that the relationship between 
element (1,9)-th has PCC value of 0.6316 which indicates 
high correlation between records 1 and 9. However, element 
(1,9) shown in Figure 1(b) has NCC value of 0.0393, which 
indicates low correlation. By comparing the correlation of 
records 1 and 9 with other 9 records and considering the 
threshold value, we can notice that record number 1 has also 
high PCC correlation with records number 2 to 7 and 9. Thus 
it can be considered as a normal record. The PCC value for 
record number 9 also indicates high correlation with records 
number 5, 6 and 8, so it can be considered as a normal record 
as well. However, the NCCs between record 1 and records 2 
to 6 are high, and the NCC between record 1 and 9 is low. 
As a result, we can conclude that record 9 is anomaly.  
More specifically, Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the PCC 
and NCC values of one normal record as first record and 
seven Teardrop attacks in Figure 2 and seven Back attacks in 
Figure 3. The NCC values (0.0786 and 0.0885 0.0172, 
0.0223) showed the relationships between 1
st
















 records in Figure 4, respectively. These values 
point that the anomaly records must be hidden in records 2, 
3, 5 and 6. However, PCC cannot detect these anomalies. 
For training purposes, we have randomly chosen 4,210 
records including normal and six types of attacks. The 
distribution of records is listed in Table I. Next subsection 
shows the results of performance comparison between NCC 
and PCC. 
 












Figure 2.  The comparison of the correlation coefficients calculated by 
PCC and NCC between one normal traffic and seven “Teardrop” attacks 
separately. 
  












Figure 3.  The comparison of the correlation coefficients calculated by 
PCC and NCC between one normal traffic and seven “Back” attacks 
separately. 
The trained NCC-based MI is evaluated on the testing 
dataset containing normal and attack records. By considering 
the chosen threshold, the confusion matrix in Table I shows 
the correlation results of 2,352 normal records placed at the 
beginning of the testing dataset with 1,857 attack records. 
The distribution of records is listed in Table II. Next 
subsection shows the results of performance comparison 
between NCC-based MI and PCC methods. 
TABLE I.  CONFUSION MATRIX FOR NCC 
Predicted 
Actual 
Normal Attack %Correct 
Normal 2319 33 98.59 
Attack 21 1836 98.86 
TABLE II.  SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION ON THE TETSTING DATASET 
Class 











C. Experimental analysis 
The quality of the detection techniques can be identified 
by the probabilities of detection rate and false positive rate. 
We compare these two measures of our method NCC-based 
MI with PCC method. Assuming that the first 2,353 records 
of the dataset are normal records, the comparison results are 
shown in Table III. 
Zhiyuan et al. in [24] shows more detailed description in 
calculating the detection rate (DR) and false positive rate 
(FPR). The following formulas are used to compute 
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where, 
 TP: the number of actual attack classified as attack 
 TN: the number of actual normal classified as 
normal 
 FP: the number of actual normal classified as attack 
 FN: the number of actual attack classified as normal 
  
TABLE III.  COMPARISON DETECTION RATE AND FALSE ALARM 





False positive rate 
(%) 
Accuracy (%) 
NCC-MI 98.86 1.4 98.69 
PCC 96.6 3.96 96.27 
As shown in Table III that the detection rate of NCC-
based MI is 98.86% which outperforms the detection rate of 
PCC (95.69). In addition, for the false positive alarm rate 
NCC-based MI (1.4) also performs better than PCC (3.96). 
Furthermore, the accuracy rate of our method is 98.69%, 
which is better than the accuracy rate of the PCC method. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has introduced a nonlinear correlation 
coefficient-based Mutual Information for measuring the 
relationship between discrete variables. This technique 
applies information theory and machine learning technique 
for calculating the correlation coefficient between network 
records. We have designed our method based on the 
assumption that intruder’s behavior is different from a 
normal flow. One of the ways to identify the deviation from 
the normal flow is to calculate the relationship between 
communication records. Although, linear correlation can 
detect the relationship between two dependent variables, in 
real world the correlations can also be nonlinear. The 
  
proposed method is sensitive to any relationship, including 
linear relationship. We have investigated our findings by 
comparing with Pearson’s correlation coefficient method. 
The experimental results have shown that NCC-based MI 
achieves higher detection rate, lower false alarms and 
accuracy rate than PCC. 
However, the proposed method still needs further 
research in some aspects, which will be our target in the 
future works. For example, we will consider when the attack 
occurs and what the type of an attack is.  
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